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ABSTRACT
Price variation for identical cars at the same dealership is commonly assumed to arise because
dealers with market power are able to price discriminate among their customers. In this paper we
show that while price discrimination may be one element of price variation, price variation also
arises from inventory fluctuations. Inventory fluctuations create scarcity rents for cars that are in
short supply. The price variation due to inventory fluctuations thus functions to efficiently allocate
particular cars that are in restricted supply to those customers who value them most highly. Our
empirical results show that a dealership moving from a situation of inventory shortage to an average
inventory level lowers transaction prices by about 1% ceteris paribus, corresponding to 15% of
dealers' average per vehicle profit margin or $250 on the average car. Shorter resupply times also
decrease transaction prices for cars in high demand. For traditional dealerships, inventory explains
49% of the combined inventory and demographic components of the predicted price. For so-called
'no-haggle' dealerships, the percentage explained by inventory increases to 74%.
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Why do identical cars at the same dealership sell for diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent customers?
At a superﬁcial level, the reason is that prices are individually negotiated between dealers and
customers. The obvious follow-up question is, why are retail automobile prices individually
negotiated? A common answer is that negotiation is a way for dealers with market power to
price discriminate among their customers. Given the high price of a new car, it would not
be surprising if the cost of gaining information about a consumer’s willingness to pay is, in
comparison, small enough to make the dealer’s eﬀort to assess a consumer’s valuation and
negotiate individual prices more proﬁtable than posting a ﬁxed price.
In this paper we argue that price discrimination is not the only reason why car prices are
negotiated. Because car supply is restricted in the short term to the inventory on a dealer’s lot,
and demand is volatile, the opportunity cost of selling a car of a speciﬁc make, model, options,
and color is constantly changing with demand for that particular car within the geographic
market. Even if inter-dealer vehicle trades mean that supply is not absolutely ﬁxed, this trading
is limited because of the transaction cost of bartering with other dealers and thin markets due
to the large variety of cars. Thus there are eﬀectively new, dealer-level optimal prices each
day - or perhaps more frequently - for each car. Not posting a price, and instead negotiating
with the consumer, allows the dealer to incorporate the latest information on inventory levels
into the oﬀered price. As a result, the opportunity cost to the dealer of selling a car—and
therefore the transaction price—is likely to vary across two consumers who purchase the same
car on diﬀerent days, even without diﬀerences between them in willingness to pay or bargaining
ability. This explanation for price variation diﬀers importantly from the price discrimination
explanation because it does not imply that there is market power. Indeed, under the inventory
explanation, price diﬀerences are the result of scarcity rents, and function to eﬃciently allocate
particular cars that are in restricted supply to those customers who value them most highly.
While these two explanations are very diﬀerent, they are also not mutually exclusive. For
example, there is no reason that a dealer with market power would not vary its price both
according to the willingness to pay of individual customers and according to the opportunity
cost of the vehicle induced by inventory scarcity (see Borenstein and Rose (1994) for an example
of this behavior in the airline industry). The purpose of this paper is to argue that inventory
scarcity may be an important but neglected component of price variation, and to estimate the
extent to which inventory concerns can explain the variation in prices in retail automobile sales.
We construct a simple dynamic model of a car dealer’s pricing problem as a function of
inventory. Solving this model for particular parameter values, we ﬁnd that the price a dealer
charges should vary with two factors: the amount of inventory of that speciﬁc car in his lot
2and the number of days remaining until a shipment of new inventory arrives.
The intuition behind the eﬀect of inventory on prices is as follows. If a dealer’s inventory of
particular car is increased, with no change in the resupply schedule, the dealer’s opportunity cost
from selling that vehicle has decreased because the car is now less scarce relative to expected
future demand. In contrast, any sale when inventory is very low has a higher opportunity
cost because the dealer may not be able to sell to a future high-valuation consumer who could
arrive after the last car is sold but before the new inventory arrives. To understand the intuition
behind the eﬀect of resupply time on prices, consider a dealer who is approaching the date when
a new shipment of a particular car will arrive. As the date nears, the opportunity cost of selling
the remaining cars on his lot falls conditional on the inventory level, because soon the dealer will
be restocked. Thus, as days to resupply falls, the dealer will be more willing to discount the car
to a consumer with a low valuation. As we will show later, the price eﬀect of inventory occurs
despite the fact that the dealer is correct about the distribution from which the reservation
prices of buyers are drawn; the dealer is not updating his expectation or “learning” about the
underlying level of demand.
Our model is related to a known class of models in the operations research literature which
relate prices to inventory in a monopoly pricing environment (see Yano and Gilbert (2003) for
a detailed review of this literature). Our model shows that it is possible for these results to
carry over to a negotiated price environment.
The empirical section of the paper provides evidence for the relationship of prices to both
inventory levels and resupply times. A dealership moving from a situation of inventory shortage
to an average inventory level lowers transaction prices by about 1% ceteris paribus, correspond-
ing to 15% of dealers’ average per vehicle proﬁt margin or $250 on the average car. Additionally,
shorter resupply times decrease transaction prices for cars in high demand. We consider the
potential endogeneity of prices and inventory levels due to, for example, a temporary demand
shock that raises the price of a model and lowers inventory levels. We use a series of ﬁxed
eﬀects speciﬁcations as well as instrumental variables to control for this potential problem.
Our results remain robust to these approaches, as well as to alternative deﬁnitions of inventory.
We present some extensions of our results showing that local inventory also aﬀects transaction
prices and that the eﬀect of inventory is stronger for car models in high demand. Finally, we
use our estimates to calculate that the share of the price variation attributable to either inven-
tory or demographics that is due to inventory is 49% in our sample. For so-called “no-haggle”
dealerships, inventory explains 74% of the combined inventory and demographic components
of the price variation.
We are not aware of any empirical work in economics that discusses inventory ﬂuctuations as
3a source of scarcity rents. However, there is some research that analyzes the interplay of prices
and inventory, albeit with a substantially diﬀerent focus than our paper. In particular, there are
recent papers that solve a dynamic model of optimal inventory investment and estimate it with
data on prices and inventories. Hall and Rust (2000) build such a model to analyze the pricing
and inventory behavior of a steel wholesaler who also negotiates prices with his customers and
displays substantial ﬂuctuation in day-to-day inventory of diﬀerent products. Copeland, Dunn,
and Hall (2005) model the optimal pricing and production decisions of auto manufacturers
which sell overlapping vintages of the same product simultaneously. They estimate their model
using aggregate data on transaction prices, quantities, and inventories, and ﬁnd that prices of
cars fall by 9% over the course of a model year. A key conclusion of the paper is that about
1/2 of this price decline is driven by a ‘build-to-stock’ (as opposed to a ‘build-to-order’) policy
practiced by the manufacturers. Copeland and Hall (2005) examine how the Big Three auto
makers accommodate shocks to demand. They estimate a dynamic proﬁt maximizing model
of the ﬁrm that takes inventories into account and show that when a manufacturer is exposed
to a demand shock, sales adjust immediately, prices adjust gradually, and production adjusts
only after a delay.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we develop a simple model to illustrate the
relation of prices and inventory levels and derive empirical predictions. In section 3 we describe
our data and discuss the measurement of inventory in that context. In section 4 we discuss
estimation issues. In section 5 we estimate the price-inventory relationship. In section 6 we
analyze the robustness of the empirical results. In section 7 we consider a number of extensions
to the basic results. In section 8 we determine the share of the price variation attributable to
either inventory or demographics that is due to inventory. In section 9 we conclude.
2 Inventory and prices
To develop an intuition for the relation of prices and inventory we set up a simple inﬁnite
horizon model of dealer pricing with stochastic demand. We then derive dealer pricing as a
function of inventory for an example. We use the insights from the model to derive empirical
predictions.
2.1 Pricing Model
Suppose that a dealer has a lot size of L > 1. This determines the maximum number of
cars the dealer can hold in inventory at any given time. One consumer arrives every period
and has a reservation price r drawn from a distribution gr. The dealer receives a shipment
of S ≤ L cars every T periods. This supply is ﬁxed in the short run and is thus treated as
4exogenous for the dealer’s pricing decision. We explored whether this assumption is an accurate
reﬂection of the supply relationship between dealers and manufacturers. In interviews with car
dealers and manufacturers we found that, while dealers order frequently from manufacturers,
the lag between the order and when the dealer actually receives the car is at least 45 days
and typically 90 days. Within that time period, dealers cannot obtain additional cars from the
manufacturer for delivery at that shipping date.1 Also, they cannot reduce their order, or alter
its composition.2
If the dealer has no cars on the lot, he cannot sell any cars until the next shipment. We
assume that consumers drop out of the market or purchase from another dealer if they ﬁnd no
inventory. If the dealer has more than L − S cars on the lot when a supply of S cars arrives,
we assume that the dealer has to return the cars that do not ﬁt on the lot to the manufacturer
and in doing so incurs a “return fee” f ≥ 0 for each returned car.3
We assume that price is determined according to a standard Roth-Nash bargaining model.
The price paid by the consumer who arrives at the dealership at time t (pt) is a function of the
dealership’s opportunity cost (o), the buyer’s reservation price (r) and the bargaining power λ
of the seller relative to the buyer. Since exactly one consumer arrives each period, we subscript
consumers’ reservation prices r and bargaining power λ with t:
pt = (rt − ot)λt + ot (1)
This expression assumes that each party earns its disagreement payoﬀ (what it would earn
if negotiations were to fail) plus a share of the incremental gains from trade in time t, with
proportion λt ∈ [0,1] going to the seller. When λt = 1 the dealer sells at the reservation price
of the buyer. When λt = 0, the dealer has no bargaining power and sells at his opportunity
cost.4
1However, they can exchange vehicles with other dealers. We do not consider this possibility in the model,
but in the empirical analysis we control for inter-dealer trades. Please see section 3.2 for a discussion of dealer
trades.
2Because of our focus on the dealer’s short run pricing problem we not address in this model the interesting
issue raised in Carlton (1978) and Dana (2001), namely that a ﬁrm chooses both a price at which to sell its
good and a level of availability. In the context of car dealers, this would involve the dealer choosing to have a
full or limited selection on his lot and then compensating consumers for the beneﬁt or cost of that choice with
the price of the car. The model presented in this section will link prices to inventory levels, irrespective of how
inventory levels were chosen by the dealer, and will thus apply to the situations discussed in Carlton (1978) and
Dana (2001). Empirically, because all the estimations in our paper include dealer ﬁxed eﬀects, we are eﬀectively
controlling for the strategic choice of availability on the part of the dealer by estimating the eﬀect of inventory
oﬀ intra-dealer inventory levels.
3The lot size constraint together with this “return fee” has the same eﬀect in this model as an inventory
holding cost (see below).
4One might argue that the bargaining power of consumers should vary with the amount of cars in inventory.
However, this assumes that consumers are aware of inventory levels. Since dealers typically store a large fraction
5In order to understand how inventory and the time until the next shipment aﬀect prices,
we must now determine how they aﬀect the opportunity cost of the dealer. Intuitively, the
dealer has to trade oﬀ selling the car today versus waiting until tomorrow and selling the car
to a buyer who might have a higher valuation. To formulate this problem more precisely, we
now set up a Bellman equation that describes the dealer’s proﬁt as a function of inventory and
time relative to when the next shipment arrives. This allows us to specify the opportunity cost
of the dealer, ot, in terms of the dealer’s continuation proﬁts for diﬀerent inventory levels.
Deﬁne an inventory cycle c as the set of time periods between two shipments. We number
time periods within inventory cycles, i.e. at t = 1 a shipment arrives. t = T is the last period
of cycle c. Cycle c + 1 starts the next period with a new shipment of size S. We can write the
dealer’s proﬁt in period 1 < t < T of cycle c given inventory n ≥ 1 as:
Π(n,t,c) = Pr(rt ≥ ot)(Eλ [Er[λ(rt − ot) + ot | rt ≥ ot]] + Π(n − 1,t + 1,c))+
Pr(rt < ot) Π(n,t + 1,c)
(2)
where ot = Π(n,t + 1,c) − Π(n − 1,t + 1,c). To understand the dealer’s proﬁt notice that the
dealer will sell a car if the reservation price of the buyer exceeds the dealer’s opportunity cost
(rt ≥ ot). In this case, the dealer will obtain revenue of λ(rt − ot) + ot and enter period t + 1
with n − 1 cars. If there are no gains from trade (rt < ot) the dealer will not sell a car and
enters period t + 1 with n cars. The opportunity cost of the dealer, ot, is the diﬀerence in the
dealer’s continuation proﬁts from entering the next period with n cars instead of n − 1 cars.
At the end of an inventory cycle (period T) the dealer, if he sells a car in period T, enters
the next inventory cycle c+1 with n−1+S cars on his lot; this is because the dealer receives a
shipment of S cars to start the next inventory cycle. If the dealer does not sell a car in the last
period of the inventory cycle he enters the next inventory cycle c+1 with n+S cars. Formally,
Π(n,T,c) = Pr(rT ≥ oT)(Eλ [Er[λ(rT − oT) + oT | r ≥ oT]] + Π(n − 1 + S,1,c + 1))+
Pr(rT < oT) (Π(n + S,1,c + 1))
(3)
where oT = Π(n + S,1,c + 1) − Π(n − 1 + S,1,c + 1).
At the beginning of a new inventory cycle (period 1) the dealer may have to return cars if
the shipment S exceeded the available space on the lot at the end of the last inventory cycle.
In particular, if the dealer entered the new inventory cycle with n cars (including the new
shipment S), she needs to return max{0,n−L} cars to the manufacturer at a return fee f per
of cars in lots that are not visible from the front of the dealership, or in separate (cheaper) back lots, consumers
are not normally not able to assess how many cars a dealer has in stock at any particular time. Although a few
dealers have begun posting inventory in recent years, this was very rare at the time of our sample.
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Π(n,1,c) = −f max{0,n − L}+
Pr(rt ≥ ot)(Eλ [Er[λ(rt − ot) + ot | rt ≥ ot]] + Π(min{n,L} − 1,2,c))+
Pr(rt < ot) Π(min{n,L},2,c)
(4)
where oT = Π(min{n,L},2,c) − Π(min{n,L} − 1,2,c).
To fully characterize dealer proﬁts, if the dealer has no inventory, his continuation proﬁts
are those of the ﬁrst period of the new inventory cycle.
Π(0,t,c) = Π(S,1,c + 1) (5)
Using (2), (3), (4) and (5), we can derive the opportunity cost of the buyer and the expected
price for a simple example in which an inventory cycle lasts 3 periods, the dealer is supplied
with exactly one vehicle at the beginning of each cycle, the dealer’s lot holds at most 3 cars,
and the dealer’s return fee is 0.05 (S = 1,T = 3,L = 3,f = 0.05). Also, we assume that the
bargaining power λ and the reservation price of the buyer r are identically but independently
distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. We ﬁnd that in steady state the opportunity cost of
the seller are as follows:
Dealer’s Opportunity Cost
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
n = 1 0.56 0.50 0.41
n = 2 0.36 0.30 0.24
n = 3 0.17 0.08 -0.05
To get an intuition for how the dealer’s opportunity cost changes, ﬁrst ﬁx an inventory level,
for example n = 1, and consider the change in opportunity cost as we move closer to the next
shipment. A dealer who has one car on the lot in period 1 has two more opportunities to sell
that car before he receives a replacement car if he does not sell the car today and thus holds out
for a high valuation buyer by setting the minimum oﬀer he is willing to accept at 0.56. In the
next period, the dealer has only one opportunity to sell that vehicle before the next shipment
to a buyer who may have a higher reservation price than today’s buyer, resulting in a lower
opportunity cost for the vehicle. In the third period, the dealer has no other opportunity to
sell the car before the next shipment arrives, and the opportunity cost falls still further. It does
not fall to zero since the dealer, with two open spaces on the lot, can hold on to the car and
sell it in the next inventory cycle. One might think that for n = 1 it should not matter how
close the dealer is to the next shipment since even if the next shipment arrives, the dealer’s lot
is large enough to accommodate both the old and the new car. However, holding out too long
7for a high valuation buyer increases the probability that during a subsequent inventory cycle
the dealer is going to run into a lot-size constraint.
To further understand the intuition for how the dealer’s opportunity cost changes, now ﬁx
the number of periods until the next shipment, for example t = 3 (meaning a shipment arrives
next period), and consider the change in opportunity cost as the dealer has more cars on the
lot. If the dealer has only one car in inventory with a shipment coming the next period, he
holds out for a higher valuation buyer than if he has two cars in inventory. This is because in
the latter case he wants to reduce the probability that he will start the next inventory cycle
with three cars on the lot—increasing the probability of eventually running into the inventory
constraint. Finally, notice that if the dealer will be resupplied next period and has three cars
on the lot, his opportunity cost is negative, i.e. the dealer would be willing to accept a negative
payment from a consumer. This is because for n = 3 in the last period before a new shipment
(t = 3), if the dealer does not sell the car he will have to pay a return cost of 0.05. Hence, the
dealer is better oﬀ accepting a small negative oﬀer rather than paying the return cost.
Of course, the dealer’s opportunity costs are not the negotiated prices unless λ = 0. The
expected negotiated prices can be derived by taking the expectation over r and λ in equation (1):
Expected negotiated prices
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
n = 1 0.67 0.62 0.56
n = 2 0.52 0.47 0.43
n = 3 0.38 0.31 0.23
The key comparative statics from this example are, ﬁrst, that holding inventory constant,
prices decrease as we move closer to a new shipment. Second, holding the time until a new
shipment constant, prices decrease as there are more cars in inventory.5 These comparative
static predictions are not unique to this setup; they are shared across a class of models in
operations research in which ﬁrms face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a
deadline, demand is downward sloping and stochastic, and a ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize
expected revenues (see Yano and Gilbert (2003) for a detailed review of this literature). The
existing class of models diﬀer from our setup in two ways: they assume that prices are set by
a monopolist instead of being negotiated, and that a given stock has to be sold by a deadline
instead of having to sell recurring shipments over an inﬁnite horizon. One of the closest papers
to our own in this line of research is a model by Gallego and Ryzin (1994) which characterizes
the proﬁt maximizing prices of a monopolist over a ﬁnite horizon as a function of the inventory
5These comparative statics hold for all of the many diﬀerent parameter values for which we have solved this
model.
8and the time remaining until the deadline. Their model allows for a salvage value at the end of
the (single) inventory cycle and is thus a good representation of pricing within one cycle in our
model, except for the fact their salvage value is linear in the number of units left at the end
of the inventory cycle whereas in our model the value of inventory that carries over into the
next period is non-linear in quantity. Another class of models solve versions of the so-called
“Knapsack” problem in which an agent has to decide which of stochastically arriving items of
diﬀerent values to include in a “Knapsack” with ﬁnite capacity (see, for example, Papastavrou,
Rajagopalan, and Kleywegt (1996)). These models also yield the same comparative statics as
our example.
Finally, there are four important features of the model to note. First, while the model
makes a clear prediction that, holding the time until a new shipment constant, prices decrease
as there are more cars in inventory, the model yields no general prediction about the relative
size of the inventory eﬀect over diﬀerent days until the next shipment. Similarly, while the
model predicts that, holding inventory constant, prices decrease as we move closer to a new
shipment, it generates no general predictions about whether this eﬀect is larger for small or
large inventories. Hence, the existence and direction of such interactions will be an empirical
question.
Second, in steady state, the dealer is in each inventory state with a reasonable probability,
except full capacity which happens extremely rarely.6 This will be important for identifying
the price eﬀects of inventory in our empirical analysis.
Steady state probabilities
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
n = 0 0.00 0.37 0.66
n = 1 0.85 0.57 0.32
n = 2 0.15 0.06 0.02
n = 3 0.004 0.0007 0.00006
Third, the price eﬀect occurs despite the fact that the dealer is correct about the distribution
from which the reservation prices of buyers are drawn. In other words, price ﬂuctuations by
the dealer are not the result of the dealer updating his expectation or “learning” about the
underlying level of demand. Price changes occur simply because the dealer balances stochastic
demand and ﬁxed short-run supply.
Fourth, the price eﬀect of inventory and time to next shipment are not dependent on
whether shipment quantities and/or inventory cycles are chosen optimally by the dealer.7 The
6Since the ﬁrm is resupplied in period 1, it never has 0 cars in period 1.
7With regards to the optimality of the dealer’s choices, we have anecdotal evidence that manufacturers play
a role in what dealers can order, and that supply is not generally chosen in the best interest of the dealer. For
9hypothesized eﬀects arise because, regardless of how shipment quantities and/or inventory
cycles are chosen, demand is stochastic while supply from the dealer’s perspective is ﬁxed at
least 45 days before cars are delivered and typically 90 days before.
2.2 Empirical predictions
We have several goals for the paper. Our ﬁrst and primary goal is to see whether our two
comparative statics hold:
• Controlling for the time until a new shipment arrives, prices decrease as there are more
cars in inventory.
• Controlling for inventory, prices decrease as a dealer moves closer to a new shipment.
A second goal in our paper is to explore some other factors that aﬀect the inventory-price
relationship. In particular, the inventory-price relationship may be diﬀerent for cars which are
in overall short supply. For these car models it is close to impossible for dealers to make use
of dealer trades to obtain additional cars of a particular type on short notice if their demand
realization for that car is higher than expected.8 Thus, we expect to observe that inventory
eﬀects are larger for these cars than for others where dealer trades may be costly but possible.
We also examine whether the price-inventory relationship diﬀers at the end of the month.
Manufacturers and dealers impose non-linear sales targets on sales personnel which increase
their incentive to sell additional cars at the end of the month. Due to these incentives we
expect to observe that at the end of the month dealers are less likely to hold out for a high
price when inventory levels are low than they would at other times. We also expect to ﬁnd
a stronger price eﬀect of inventory when a dealer lot is close to maximum capacity. This is
because the inventory cost associated with the last few cars which the dealer can store on his
lot may be particularly high. For example, the dealer might have to use customer parking,
thereby decreasing revenue, or reduce spacing between parked cars, increasing the danger of
damaging cars on the lot. Hence, we expect that inventory that is close to lot capacity will
decrease the dealer’s opportunity cost of selling a car and thus decrease transaction prices.
The third goal in our paper is to test empirical predictions about how much of the varia-
tion in car prices can be explained with price discrimination and how much can be explained
with inventory ﬂuctuations. Since we measure only a subset of what dealers observe when
price discriminating among consumers, we cannot estimate precisely what fraction of the price
example, manufacturers often force dealers to take delivery of low demand cars as a condition for obtaining some
high demand cars.
8We discuss dealer trades in detail in section 3.2.
10variation can be attributed to these two factors. We can, however, predict how this fraction
should change as a function of the type of dealership. Since many consumers have a high
disutility of bargaining, we have seen over the last decade the emergence of dealerships which
promise consumers a “no-haggle” price. Most prominently, this is true for the dealership chain
AutoNation. While the “no-haggle” policy is popularly believed to mean “ﬁxed-price” this is
not true; these dealerships set car prices daily based on their inventory and demand conditions.
The no-haggle policy simply means that salespeople are discouraged from varying price across
buyers who arrive on a particular day. Consequently, we expect that inventory ﬂuctuations
should explain a larger percentage of price variation for AutoNation dealerships than other
dealerships.
3 Data
Our data come from a major supplier of marketing research information (henceforth MRI). MRI
collects transaction data from a sample of dealers in the major metropolitan areas in the US.
We have data containing every new car transaction at California dealerships in the MRI sample
from July 1, 1998 to May 31, 2003. These data include customer information, the make, model
and trim level of the car, ﬁnancing information, trade-in information, dealer-added extras, and
the proﬁtability of the car and the customer to the dealership.
3.1 Inventory measurement
We measure inventory in our data on the level of the interaction of make, model, model year,
body type, transmission, doors, and trim level. This means that any given make and model,
for example a Honda Accord, can have diﬀerent inventory levels at the same dealer, depending
on whether it is the 1999 or 2000 model, whether it is an EX or LX trim level, whether it
is manual or automatic, etc. Tracking inventory on the level of this deﬁnition is important
because consumers may have preferences over these attributes and some varieties of a make
and model may be in short supply while the others are not. By measuring inventory this
precisely, however, we are making an assumption that consumers essentially do not substitute
between versions of a car very easily. We will test this assumption later in the paper.
Since our data are derived from a record of transactions, we do not have a direct measure of
inventory. However, we know for every car that was sold how long the car was on the lot. This
measure, DaysToTurn, allows us to derive when the car arrived on the dealer’s lot. Knowing
the arrival and departure dates for each car sold at each dealership allows us to construct how
many cars were on the dealership’s lot at any given time by “rolling back” the data. Moving
from the latest sale backwards, each car can be counted as part of the dealer’s inventory for the
11number of days it was on the lot. This measure will be accurate at the beginning of our sample
period because all cars on a dealer’s lot at that point have been sold during our sample period
of four years, thereby generating an observation which allows us to identify when it came on
the lot. Notice, however, that our inventory measure will be less accurate as we approach the
last year of the sample period. This is because we only observe when cars came on the lot
if they get sold during our sample period. Many cars which come onto the lot at the end of
our sample period are sold after our observations end. Consequently, we exclude the last 12
months of our sample from our price speciﬁcations. We choose 12 months because the days to
turn for nearly all (99.4%) cars fall within this time frame. Hence, our ﬁnal dataset comprises
car purchases for almost four years from July 1, 1998 to May 31st, 2002. Figures 1, 2, and 3
show the inventory levels over time for a Honda, Chevrolet, and Mercedes dealer, respectively.
For each of these dealers we have graphed the inventory levels of three typical cars over a
two-month period, including when cars arrive on the lot and when they are sold.
Having measured inventory at each dealer on each day, we obtain a wide range of inventory
levels (0-80 vehicles). We do not have a prior on the exact functional form which inventory
should take in determining prices. One might expect that inventory will have a diﬀerent
relationship with prices at large versus small dealerships, and the marginal impact of a unit of
inventory may be smaller for larger levels of inventory. We therefore considered three diﬀerent
methods to scale our inventory measure.
First, we considered normalizing inventory by average dealer sales volume to create a mea-
sure of inventory level relative to average sales rate. This approach proved problematic in our
sample (and is thus not reported) because dealer inventory should not necessarily scale linearly
with sales. To see this notice that even small dealers need a certain number of cars on the lot
to be able to oﬀer variety to consumers. This implies that a large dealer does not necessarily
need more cars on the lot compared to a small dealer; given the same variety the large dealer
can simply choose to be resupplied more often.
Second, we considered using indicators for when a dealership’s inventory is below certain
percentile levels speciﬁc to the dealership. This second approach proved problematic (and is
thus also not reported) because, given the ﬁne granularity of our car deﬁnition, the 5th, 10th
and even 25th percentile of inventory is 0 for small dealerships (see the top panel of Figure 4
for a histogram of daily inventories for all dealers). This points to a larger problem, which we
address next, namely that there is not much variation in inventory of a particular car for small
dealerships.
We settled on a third approach, namely to restrict the sample to dealerships which sell
a minimum number of cars and use the raw number of cars in inventory as our inventory
measure. In this latter case we allow for two coeﬃcients on the marginal car, one for inventory
12levels below 11 and one for 11 and above. Speciﬁcally, we restrict the sample to dealership-
car combinations for which the dealership sells at least 3 cars per month according to our
deﬁnition of a car (see the bottom panel of Figure 4 for a histogram of daily inventories for
such dealership-car combinations) and then simply count the cars in inventory. In choosing
this third approach we assume that an additional unit of inventory has the same eﬀect for
dealers of diﬀerent size (in section 5.2 we will show empirically that this assumption is a good
approximation of reality.) This approach leaves 351,916 observations and will be the sample
used throughout the paper. Summary statistics for the dataset are in Table 1.
3.2 Resupply measurement
Since our predictions on inventory are conditioned on the number of days until the next ship-
ment of a car arrives, we need a measure of “days to resupply” for each car at each dealership.
The problem in deﬁning this measure is that there are two types of car arrivals in our data.
The ﬁrst type is the arrival of a shipment from a manufacturer. The second type is the arrival
of a car that was traded with another dealership. For both types of arrivals the “days to turn”
variable is set to zero on the car’s arrival day. We are concerned about traded vehicles be-
cause their arrival is not known in advance and should thus not factor into the dealer’s pricing
decision in the same way as manufacturer shipments. Instead, vehicles are typically traded
because a consumer wants a speciﬁc car and the dealer oﬀers to obtain this car for the con-
sumer at another dealership in the region. According to industry participants we interviewed,
such “trades” are indeed always an exchange. If the competing dealer agrees on the trade,
an employee of the requesting dealership drives an agreed-upon exchange vehicle to the other
dealership and brings the requested vehicle back. If the cars are of diﬀerent value, dealers settle
the diﬀerence at invoice prices.9
We use speciﬁc diﬀerences in the way that trades and regular shipments get on the dealer’s
lot to identify which cars are dealer-initiated trades. In particular, we use three pieces of
information: the odometer of the vehicle at the time it was sold, the number of days the vehicle
was on the lot when sold, and the number of other vehicles which arrived on the dealer’s lot
during the same day. The idea is as follows: If a car was not sold within the ﬁrst few days of
arriving on the lot it is unlikely to be a requested trade. Among those cars which sold after only
a few days on the lot, those cars which have low mileage are unlikely to be requested trades.
This is because a requested trade will have been driven from one dealership to the other. Also,
a requested trade arrives on the dealership’s lot after having been on another dealer’s lot and
9In multiple interviews, we asked repeatedly whether there were any exceptions to basing transfer payments
on invoice prices. No interviewee had heard of any other practice.
13perhaps having already been test driven for some time. The problem is to determine what
should qualify as “low mileage” or “high mileage.” We construct a mileage cut-oﬀ as follows.
We calculate the 95th percentile of odometer mileage for each combination of car, dealer, and
number of days in inventory when a car sells, but only using a sample of cars for which at least
three cars according to our (very granular) inventory “car” deﬁnition arrived on the lot on the
same day. Since cars are traded one by one, it is highly unlikely that such a sample will contain
traded cars. We then deﬁne a TradeRequested as a vehicle that is sold within 4 days of arriving
on the lot and has an odometer reading that exceeds the 95th quantile as derived above. Since
there is a received trade for every requested trade, we deﬁne a car as a TradeReceived if it had
an odometer reading that exceeded the same 95th quantile, was not a TradeRequested, and was
the only car of that make that arrived on the dealership’s lot on that day. Approximately 8%
of vehicles are classiﬁed as TradeRequested and another 8% are classiﬁed as TradeReceived in
the original sample. This matches well with industry estimates that somewhat less than 20%
of sold cars are dealer trades.
We can now deﬁne DaysToResupply as the number of days until a vehicle of the same
inventory “car” deﬁnition arrives, excluding vehicles that were classiﬁed as TradeRequested or
TradeReceived.10 The distribution of DaysToResupply for the full dataset and for the restricted
dataset we use in this paper (dealership-car combinations for which the dealership sells at least
3 cars per month according to our deﬁnition of a car) can be seen in Figure 5. We also graph
the distribution of the number of vehicles of the same inventory “car” deﬁnition that arrive in
a single shipment (see Figure 6).
We will use TradeRequested as an indicator variable. Since a dealer bears additional trans-
action and transportation costs for requested trades, we expect him to pass those on to the
consumer.
We have excluded from the data all transaction that fall after 45 days before the introduction
of the next model year. We omit these transactions from the dataset as their resupply conditions
are not normal – instead, these prices reﬂect the eﬀect of “ﬁre-sales” to clear dealer lots to
prepare for the introduction of new models.
3.3 Dependent variable
The price observed in the dataset is the price that the customer pays for the vehicle including
factory-installed accessories and options and the dealer-installed accessories contracted for at
10A small percentage of observations end up with very high DaysToResupply using this procedure. We drop
about 4000 observations where the DaysToResupply is greater than six months.
14the time of sale that contribute to the resale value of the car.11 The Price variable we use as
the dependent variable is this price, minus the ManufacturerRebate, if any, given directly to the
consumer, and minus what is known as the TradeInOverAllowance. TradeInOverAllowance is
the diﬀerence between the trade-in price paid by the dealer to the consumer and the estimated
wholesale value of the trade-in vehicle (as booked by the dealer). We adjust for this amount
to account for the possibility, for example, that dealers may oﬀer consumers a low price for
the new car because they are proﬁting from the trade-in. Our measure of price also takes into
account any variation in holdback and transportation charges.
3.4 Controls
We include a car ﬁxed eﬀect for each interaction of make, model, body type, transmission,
displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level.12 We drop any observations of “cars” according
to this deﬁnition with fewer than 200 sales in California during the sample period. Cars with
this few sales have hardly any variation in inventory levels. Hence, they are unhelpful in
identifying inventory eﬀects but use up degrees of freedom. While our car ﬁxed eﬀects will
control for many of the factors that contribute to the price of a car, it will not control for the
factory- and dealer-installed options which vary within trim level. The price we observe covers
such options but we do not observe what options the car actually has. In order to control for
price diﬀerences caused by options, we include as an explanatory variable the percent deviation
of the dealer’s cost of purchasing the particular vehicle from the manufacturer from the average
cost of purchasing that car from the manufacturer in the dataset. This percent deviation, called
VehicleCost will be positive when the speciﬁc vehicle has an unobserved option (for example a
CD player) and is therefore relatively expensive compared to other examples of the same “car”
(as speciﬁed above).
To control for time variation in prices, we deﬁne a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if
the car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. A dummy variable WeekEnd speciﬁes
whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday to control for a similar, weekly eﬀect.
In addition, we introduce dummies for each month in the sample period to control for other
seasonal eﬀects and for inﬂation. If there are volume targets or sales on weekends, near the
end of the month, or seasonally, we will pick up their eﬀect on prices with these variables.
We control for the number of months between the introduction of a car’s model and when the
vehicle was sold. This proxies for how new a car design is and also for the dealer’s opportunity
11Dealer-installed accessories that contribute to the resale value include items such as upgraded tires or a
sound system, but would exclude options such as undercoating or waxing.
12This is the ﬁnest car description available in our data. Notice that we measure inventory at a slightly more
aggregate level by combining diﬀerent engine sizes.
15cost of not selling the car. Judging by the distribution of sales after car introductions, we
distinguish between sales in the ﬁrst four months, months 5-13, and month 14 and later and
assign a dummy variable to each category.
We also control for the income, education, occupation, and race of buyers by using census
data that MRI matches with the buyer’s address from the transaction record. The data is on
the level of a “block group,” which makes up about one fourth of the area and population of a
census tract. On average, block groups have about 1100 people in them.
Finally, we control for the region in which the car was sold, and possible unobserved dealer-
speciﬁc eﬀects (including the competitiveness of each dealer’s market) through dealer ﬁxed
eﬀects in all speciﬁcations.
4 Estimation issues
Conceptually, the bargaining power λt of the seller relative to buyer t from equation (1) is quite
distinct from the outside options of the seller and the buyer. While the reservation price of
the buyer and the opportunity cost of the seller determine the size of the gains from trade,
λt speciﬁes how the gains from trade are split between the parties. Empirically, we can ﬁnd
measures that are related only to the opportunity cost of the dealer, for example, current
inventory and days to resupply. We can also ﬁnd some measures that are uniquely related
to a consumer’s reservation price, for example, the degree of competition between dealers, or
the availability of substitutes for the vehicle in question (other brands, models, options, etc.).
Nonetheless, our data will not allow us to separately identify a consumer’s relative bargaining
power from her reservation price. This is because we have no direct measures of bargaining
power, such as patience or the inherent utility or disutility of bargaining for a consumer. Also,
the bargaining ability of a buyer may be correlated with measures which also determine a
consumer’s reservation price, for example income, educational status, and whether or not a
consumer has a car to trade-in. As a result, we will estimate an empirical model in which we
will be able to separate price variation due to inventory ﬂuctuations from price variation due
to price discrimination. Whether the latter part of price variations is due to heterogeneity in
reservation prices or in bargaining abilities is not a question we will be able to answer.
We are concerned about potential endogeneity of price and inventory levels. Our maintained
assumption is that inventory changes exogenously due to the random arrival of customers.
Instead what could be occurring is that a dealership has a sale for some reason and the sale
(i.e. low prices) results in low inventory. To reduce the chance that we are measuring the eﬀect
of prices on inventory instead of the reverse, we measure a dealer’s inventory two days before
the focal transaction. Thus, transactions that occur in response to a dealership’s weekend sale
16have as an inventory measure the dealer’s inventory on the preceding Thursday. In addition,
our concern is mitigated by the fact that any such endogeneity would operate in the opposite
direction of the inventory eﬀect (our results show that low inventory is associated with high
prices).
Of more concern is the potential simultaneous determination of price and inventory levels
due to a demand shock. Suppose, for example, that there is a sudden increase in consumer
taste for a particular car. For example, a particularly snowy winter in a region of the country
may simultaneously increase prices and run down inventories for four-wheel drive vehicles in
that region. We will take two approaches to account for this potential endogeneity. Our
ﬁrst approach makes extensive use of car, dealer, and time ﬁxed eﬀects (including interactions
thereof) to identify the eﬀect of inventory on price based only on short term variations in
inventory within car and dealership combinations. This means that we will be relying neither
on variation across dealerships, nor variation across cars, nor variation across months to identify
the inventory eﬀect. This makes it less likely that our result are due to demand shocks. Our
second approach is to use exogenous plant closures as an instrument for inventory. In particular,
we will use plant closures that result from ﬁres, parts shortages, ﬂoods, etc. to instrument for
the dealer inventory levels of the cars produced at these plants. We will discuss both approaches
in more detail in the next sections.
5 The price-inventory relationship
Our dependent variable is Price as deﬁned in the data section. In order to provide the appro-
priate baseline for the price of the car, we use a standard hedonic regression of log price. We
work in logs because the price eﬀect of many of the attributes of the car, such as being sold in
Northern California or in a particular month, are likely to be better modeled as a percentage
of the car’s value than as a ﬁxed dollar increment. We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
ln(Pricei) = Xiα + Diβ + Iiγ + i (6)
The X matrix is composed of transaction and car variables: car, dealer, month, and region ﬁxed
eﬀects, car costs, and controls for whether the car was purchased at the end of a month or over a
weekend. The matrix also contains an indicator for whether the buyer traded in a vehicle. The
D matrix contains demographic characteristics of the buyer and her census block group. To
this basic speciﬁcation we add a matrix I which contains various inventory-related explanatory
variables such as measures of inventory, days to resupply, and a dealer trade indicator.
175.1 Basic speciﬁcation
To estimate the eﬀect of inventory on prices, we estimate a speciﬁcation that is informed by the
dynamic programming model of section 2.1. The model indicates that prices should increase
in days to resupply, controlling for inventory and should decrease in inventory, controlling for
days to resupply. Because one additional car in inventory may have a diﬀerent eﬀect on price
if inventory levels are low versus high, we include the inventory variable as a 2-part spline in
our speciﬁcation. In particular, we estimate a diﬀerent inventory coeﬃcient for below- and
above-median inventory levels (the median is 10). Similarly, we also estimate days to resupply
as a 2-part spline (split at the median which is 4 days to resupply). This initial speciﬁcation
includes both car and dealer ﬁxed eﬀects. We include dealer ﬁxed eﬀects to be able to identify
the price-inventory relationship within and not across dealers. If we did not include dealer
ﬁxed eﬀects we would be concerned that the hypothesized negative price-inventory relationship
could be due to large dealers that simultaneously have higher absolute inventory levels and
lower prices because they are more cost-eﬃcient than small dealers.
Column 1 of Table 2 reports the results of estimating this speciﬁcation. Both inventory
coeﬃcients have the hypothesized negative coeﬃcient. For below median inventory levels (10
and fewer cars), one additional car in inventory is associated with a price that is lower by
0.085% (see variable Inventory (1-10)). For above median inventory levels (11 and more cars),
one additional car in inventory is associated with a price that is lower by 0.018% (see variable
Inventory (11+)). An increase in inventory from 1 car to 16 cars (a one standard deviation
increase) is associated with a 0.92% reduction in average price. This corresponds to 14% of
the average dealer gross margin on a vehicle in our sample. An increase in inventory by one
standard deviation when the inventory for that car is already high has a smaller eﬀect. For
example, an increase in inventory from 11 to 26 cars is associated with a 0.27% lower average
price. This corresponds to 4% of the average dealer gross margin.
Both “days to resupply” variables have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on transaction prices in this
speciﬁcation. We will explore possible reasons for this in the next section. Consumers do not pay
a diﬀerent price when for a vehicle which was requested from another dealership (TradedCar).
Other coeﬃcient estimates have the expected signs. For example, cars that are sold at the
end of the month (EndOfMonth) when sales people are trying to meet sales quotas sell for on
average 0.31% lower prices. In another example, the prices of cars that are sold more than 4
months after the model was introduced sell for on average 0.98% less than cars sold in the ﬁrst
4 months of the model cycle. Demographic variables also have the expected sign. For example,
women pay slightly more for a car, as do consumers who live in neighborhoods with a higher
percentage of residents who have less than high school education. Higher income is associated
18with lower prices, except for the highest income consumers.13
5.2 Is it reasonable not to scale inventory by dealer size?
Recall from our discussion in Section 3.1 that our inventory variable is the raw number of cars
in inventory at each dealer. This implicitly assumes that one additional unit of inventory has
the same eﬀect on price irrespective of dealer size. We now investigate whether this assumption
is reasonable. To do so we split the sample into 4 subsamples, according to quartiles of the
number of vehicles sold by each dealer of a particular car type during the model year: We
ﬁrst calculate for each dealership-car pair the number of vehicles that were sold during the
model year. Second, we split the dealership-car pairs into quartiles, according to the sales
volume we calculated. Third, we assign each observation in the dataset to the corresponding
dealership-car quartile. Finally, we use the quartiles to split the dataset into four subsamples
such that the ﬁrst subsample contains the lowest dealership-car sales volume whereas the fourth
subsample contains the highest dealership-car sales volume. For each sample we estimate
our basic speciﬁcation, however, instead of using a spline for inventory we estimate the price
eﬀect of inventory non-parametrically by using 10 dummies, one for each decile of inventory as
determined from the full dataset. Importantly, this means that the deciles are common across
all dealerships and are invariant to dealer size. Thus, each inventory dummy captures the same
absolute amount of inventory across all 4 regressions on the diﬀerent subsamples. If the eﬀect
of one additional unit of inventory is the same for small and large dealership-car combinations,
we should ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of each dummy is approximately the same across all four size
quartiles. In addition, if the full sample spline speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 2 is correctly
speciﬁed, we expect that its estimates predict the same absolute price-inventory relationship
as is predicted by the non-parametric estimates from the regressions on the four subsamples.
We compare the coeﬃcient estimates for the dummies by graphing the eﬀect of inventory
on price across the 10 dummies (see Figure 7). In addition, the graph contains the eﬀect of
inventory on price predicted by the full sample spline speciﬁcation. As can be seen from this
graph, the eﬀect of inventory on price for inventories below 10 is extremely similar regardless
of dealership-car sales volume. In addition, the full sample spline estimate tracks the non-
parametric estimates very well. For inventories above 10 the eﬀect of inventory on price for
inventories is also similar for all but the smallest dealership-car sales volume quartile. The
reason for the anomalous estimates for the smallest dealership-car sales volume quartile is
simple: since there are few cases of very high inventories for the smallest dealership-car sales
13For a through analysis of the eﬀects of demographics on car prices please see Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer,
and Silva-Risso (2003)
19volume quartile, there are few high-inventory observations in size quartile 1 and the estimates
are thus imprecise.14 To elaborate, in Figure 8 we repeat Figure 7 for each size quartile
separately and with conﬁdence intervals in addition to point estimates. The ﬁgure shows
that the eﬀect of inventory on price is estimated quite precisely across all four size quartiles
for inventories below 10. For inventories above 10, however, the estimates for size quartile 1
become very imprecise. Similarly, for inventories above 20, the estimates for size quartile 2 also
become imprecise.
We conclude that using the raw number of cars as our inventory variable is reasonable.
This is because the results from the size quartile subsample suggests that one additional unit of
inventory has approximately the same eﬀect on price regardless of dealership-car sales volume.
In addition, this analysis suggest that our full sample spline speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 2
captures the non-linear nature of the price-inventory relationship quite well.
6 Robustness Checks
We now explore the robustness of the estimated price-inventory relationship. We would like to
make sure that our results are not due to a potential endogeneity of prices and inventory levels
due to demand shocks. In a ﬁrst approach we use a sequence of ﬁxed eﬀects to address the
potential endogeneity of price and inventory (see section 6.1). Second, we use an instrumental
variables approach to estimate the eﬀect of inventory on price levels (see section 6.2).
In addition to a potential endogeneity of prices and inventory levels we would also like to
determine whether the estimated price-inventory relationship is robust to the level on which
inventory is measured. First, we want to make sure that an individual dealer’s inventory for a
car does not simply proxy for the local inventory of that car (see section 6.3). Second, we want
to make sure that our estimates are not biased by the granular deﬁnition of a car we use for
constructing our inventory measure (see section 6.4).
6.1 Are the ﬁndings due to common demand shocks?
In the next two speciﬁcations we repeat the basic speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 2 with
diﬀerent sets of ﬁxed eﬀects to address the potential endogeneity of price and inventory due to
common demand shocks. We focus on demand shocks we feel are most plausible for the market
we are studying.
So far we have included a ﬁxed eﬀect for each month in our sample, for each car (with the
14For example, there are only 37 observations to identify the highest inventory deciles in size quartile 1. See
Figure 9 for the distribution of observations across size quartiles and inventory dummies.
20above detailed deﬁnition), and for each dealer. Our ﬁrst alternative speciﬁcation accounts for
the possibility that there are car-dealership interactions that may be responsible for our result.
For example, suppose that 7 series BMWs are particularly popular in Beverly Hills. This will
lead to high prices and low inventory levels at the Beverly Hills BMW dealer and thus forms
an alternative explanation for why we ﬁnd that low inventory levels may be associated with
higher prices.15 To rule out this alternative explanation we repeat the speciﬁcation in column
1 of Table 2 with interacted car and dealer instead of separate car and dealer ﬁxed eﬀects. This
absorbs the mean price level for each car at each dealership separately; the price-inventory
relationship is thus only identiﬁed from inventory ﬂuctuations over time within car-dealer com-
binations. The results in column 2 of Table 2 are very similar to those of column 1: For below
median inventory levels (10 and fewer cars), one additional car in inventory is associated with
a price that is lower by 0.092% (see variable Inventory (1-10)). For above median inventory
levels (11 and more cars), one additional car in inventory is associated with a price that is
lower by 0.016% (see variable Inventory (11+)). Both coeﬃcients remain precisely estimated
despite a substantial decrease in degrees of freedom: while the speciﬁcation in column 1 con-
tains 1271 car ﬁxed eﬀects and 741 dealer ﬁxed eﬀects, the speciﬁcation in column 2 contains
8881 car*dealer ﬁxed eﬀects. As before, the days to resupply variables are not statistically
signiﬁcant from zero.
Our second alternative speciﬁcation accounts for the possibility that demand shocks are
short lived and local. So far, our monthly ﬁxed eﬀects absorb the price eﬀect of short term
demand shocks but only if these aﬀect all vehicle segments in all markets equally. This may
not be a good assumption: for example, suppose that a particularly snowy January in the
California Sierras increases demand for SUVs for the rest of the winter in the Sacramento area
(but not in Southern California), thus simultaneously causing high prices and low inventories
for the SUV segment in Sacramento dealerships for that quarter. To rule out this alternative
explanation, in column 3 of Table 2 we repeat the speciﬁcation of column 2 of Table 2 expanding
the month ﬁxed eﬀects to month–local area–vehicle segment ﬁxed eﬀects. The local areas are
deﬁned as DMAs, metropolitan areas that correspond to TV markets (e.g. Los Angeles, Santa
Barbara-San Marino-San Luis Obispo, San Diego, etc.).16 This set of ﬁxed eﬀects will absorb
demand shocks speciﬁc to a segment (e.g. Compact, SUV, Pickup Trucks, etc.) in a local
market for a particular month. This speciﬁcation contains 8881 car*dealer ﬁxed eﬀects and
2871 month*segment*DMA ﬁxed eﬀects (see column 3 of Table 2). We ﬁnd that for below
15Of course, a competent dealer in this situation would try to adjust his inventory in the long run and so this
story really only applies if this proves diﬃcult or the shock is transitory (see below).
16Our data contains 12 such local markets: Bakersﬁeld, Chico-Redding, Eureka, Fresno-Visalia, Los Angeles,
Monterey-Salinas, Palm Springs, Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto, San Diego, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose,
Santa Barbara-San Marino-San Luis Obispo, and Yuma-El Centro.
21median inventory levels (10 and fewer cars), one additional car in inventory is associated with
a price that is lower by 0.064% (see variable Inventory (1-10)). For above median inventory
levels (11 and more cars), one additional car in inventory is associated with a price that is
lower by 0.013% (see variable Inventory (11+)). Both variables remain precisely estimated. As
before, the days to resupply variables are not statistically signiﬁcant from zero. In summary,
the negative price-inventory relationship seems robust across speciﬁcations which account for
a variety of unobserved demand shocks as possible sources of causation.17
Before we further explore a potential endogeneity of the price-inventory relationship with
an instrumental variables approach, we ﬁrst would like to better understand why the estimates
in Table 2 have thus far not shown the positive relationship between price and days to resupply
that the dynamic programming model in Section 2.1 hypothesized. We now explore two reasons
for why we might not have found evidence of this relationship.
The ﬁrst reason could be that days to resupply as measured is too speciﬁc to the model
setup. The model assumed that resupply occurred at ﬁxed intervals and in ﬁxed quantities. A
brief glance at Figures 1, 2, and 3 show that dealers receive cars at irregular intervals and in
varying quantities. This suggests that the mechanism by which “days to resupply” and price
are related in our data is better described by a variable which measures the number of cars
that are due to arrive within set intervals. Hence, we repeat the basic car*franchise ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation with four variables in addition to DaysToResupply. They measure the number of
cars of the same type as the transacted vehicle that will arrive on the dealer’s lot one, two,
three, and four weeks, respectively, after the transaction. As can be seen in column 1 of Table 3,
none of the coeﬃcients of the new variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The second reason for why we might not have found evidence of a price-days to resupply
relationship is that its magnitude depends on the interaction between inventory levels and days
to resupply. In particular, it might be that more days to resupply is associated with higher
prices in a signiﬁcant and measurable way only if inventory levels are very low. If inventory
levels are low, it is more likely that a dealer that has to wait longer for new supply will run out
of inventory before the new shipment arrives. Since this raises the dealer’s opportunity cost of
selling a car, we expect to see that for low inventory levels more days to resupply is associated
17These results are robust to a variety of other ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations. For example, we have estimated
the price-inventory relationship with ﬁxed eﬀects that absorb average weekly prices on a subsegment-DMA level.
Speciﬁcally, we repeated the speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 2 with car ﬁxed eﬀects (1271 dummies) and
week*subsegment*DMA ﬁxed eﬀects (19176 dummies). We ﬁnd that for below median inventory levels (10 and
fewer cars), one additional car in inventory is associated with a price that is lower by 0.059% (see variable
Inventory (1-10)). For above median inventory levels (11 and more cars), one additional car in inventory is
associated with a price that is lower by 0.011% (see variable Inventory (11+)). Both variable remain precisely
estimated.
22with higher prices. To investigate this explanation, we interact the variable DaysToResupply
with an indicator LowInventory that equals 1 if inventory levels are in the lowest 10th percentile
of average inventories (3 or fewer cars according to our deﬁnition are on the lot). The results
are reported in column 2 of Table 3 and provide support for the hypothesis. As before, the
estimated coeﬃcient on DaysToResupply alone is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, however, when interacted with LowInventory, more days to resupply is associated with
higher prices (p-value 0.07). Based on this result we use the speciﬁcation in column 2 of Table 3
as the basis for further analysis.
6.2 Instrumental variables
We now proceed to using an instrumental variables approach to estimate the eﬀect of inventory
on price levels. This technique is more general than our ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcations in that it
will produce consistent estimates in the presence of any form of unobserved demand shock, not
just those we described in the previous section.
We need an instrument that is correlated with dealer inventory levels but is uncorrelated
with demand shocks that may aﬀect price levels. As in Bresnahan and Ramey (1994), we use
exogenous plant closures in the US, Mexico, and Canada to construct such an instrument. We
exclude plant closures that occurred because demand was weaker than expected. Such closures
are intended to prevent inventory build-ups and are correlated with demand shocks that may
aﬀect price levels. Our data on plant closures come from Automotive News, a trade publication
that lists every plant closure in the US, Mexico, and Canada, the duration of the closure, and
the reason why the plant was shut down. Based on this data we classiﬁed the following reasons
for plant closures as exogenous:
Reason for plant closure Closure plant-days
Design problem 8
Engine shortage 8
Explosion at parts plant 16
Faulty control arm 12
Faulty cooling system 16
Firestone tire shortage 60





Strike at plant 45
Strike at supplying parts plant 740
This table also contains the number of total plant-days of closure due to the diﬀerent reasons we
classiﬁed as exogenous.18 Notice that most closures in our data are due to strikes at supplying
18One may suspect that plant closures due to “terrorist attacks” were initiated because manufacturers antici-
23parts plants. Because we do not know the exact lag with which a plant closure aﬀects local
dealer inventories we construct a series of variables that code the number of days that the
plant that produced the transacted car was closed during two-week periods 5-6, 7-8, 9-10,
and 11-12 weeks prior to the date on which the car was sold. Because plant closures can
aﬀect diﬀerent cars diﬀerently, depending on how popular they are, we interact these variables
with car dummies to create our instruments. We also interact the plant closure variables with
whether the car was sold in Northern or Southern California; this is because manufacturers may
decide to change deliveries to regions diﬀerentially when they change their delivery schedule
due to unanticipated plant closures. We use a 2SLS speciﬁcation where we instrument for all
four inventory relations variables, namely Inventory (1-10), Inventory(11+), DaysToResupply,
and DaysToResupply*LowInventory.
We restrict the sample for this speciﬁcation to models that were produced in one of the
plants that closed for one of the reasons listed above. Because we only observe plant closures in
North America, this restricts the data set to cars produced by Chrysler (124 closure plant-days),
Ford (297 closure plant-days), General Motors (888 closure plant-days), and Volkswagen (17
closure plant-days). This leaves 75,213 observations for the instrumental variables estimation.
We begin by reestimating our standard speciﬁcation on the smaller dataset. The eﬀect of
inventory on price in column 1 of Table 4 is of slightly larger magnitude than in the full-sample
estimates for below median inventory levels (-0.11 vs. -0.088) and of slightly smaller magnitude
for above median inventory levels (-0.013 vs. -0.016). The estimates of the IV speciﬁcation are
in column 2 of Table 4. The IV point estimates on inventory are similar to the OLS estimates.
In particular, the inventory coeﬃcient for below median inventory levels is -0.17 vs. -0.11 while
the inventory coeﬃcient for above median inventory levels is -0.012 vs. -0.013. The inventory
coeﬃcient for below median inventory levels is highly signiﬁcant (p-value 0.007), however, the
standard error on the inventory coeﬃcient for above median inventory levels is too high to
concluded that it is diﬀerent from zero. Finally, in the IV speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient on
DaysToResupply*LowInventory is positive and signiﬁcant, although, at 0.052 it is larger than
in all prior OLS speciﬁcations, where it ranged from 0.0032 to 0.0045.
Our IV estimation is necessarily limited because while our instrument is clearly exogenous,
it is also relatively coarse: the reason is that we are using an instrument (plant closures) that
applies to all dealers in our sample equally to predict the dealer-speciﬁc inventory for a car.
Our IV estimates should thus be considered only supporting evidence for the negative eﬀect
pated weakening demand in the aftermath of the attacks. If this were the case, these plant closures would not
be a valid instrument. This, however, is not the case for the plant closures that we have included in our data.
Most of these plant closures happened between 9/11 and 9/13 and seem to have been prompted by a desire not
to require workers to come in during the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
24of inventory on price that we have found persisting across a number of diﬀerent ﬁxed eﬀect
models. We thus continue the paper using a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, which allow us to use the
entire dataset.
6.3 Does dealer inventory proxy for local inventory?
So far we have interpreted the estimated inventory coeﬃcients as evidence that, holding days
to resupply constant, the low inventory of an individual dealer on a speciﬁc car induces that
dealer to hold out for a higher price than when his inventory is plentiful. In the previous
sections we have shown that this ﬁnding cannot be attributed to a variety of demand shocks
that would simultaneously lead to low inventories and high prices. One explanation we have so
far not ruled out is that car-speciﬁc dealer inventories in a local area are highly correlated and
that therefore, an individual dealer’s inventory for a car simply proxies for the local inventory
of that car. If that were the case, then our estimate of the price-inventory relationship would
be evidence that overall dealer pricing is related to local market conditions, not that the low
inventory of an individual dealer on a speciﬁc car induces that dealer to hold out for a higher
price.
To rule out this explanation we repeat our main speciﬁcation from column 2 of Table 3 while
controlling for the local inventory of the transacted car. We calculate the local inventory by
summing inventory within a “car,” across all dealers in a DMA. This measure excludes the focal
dealer’s own inventory. The results are in column 3 of Table 3. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
estimates of the inventory and days to resupply variables are slightly smaller in magnitude
than in column 2. While controlling for regional inventory does not change our interpretation
that dealers price in reaction to their own inventory levels, the coeﬃcient on LocalInventory
shows that transaction prices are also associated with overall local inventory levels. Consumers
who purchase a car when regional inventory is low pay higher prices. The magnitude of the
estimated coeﬃcient indicates that a one standard deviation decrease in regional inventory (86
cars) is associated with a price increase of 0.42%.
This analysis suggests that our inventory measure is indeed picking up the eﬀect of scarcity
at the dealership level, not at the region.
6.4 Is our inventory measure too narrowly deﬁned?
We have so far measured inventory based on a very granular deﬁnition of a car. This may lead
us to underestimate the eﬀect of inventory on prices if consumers consider “cars” for which we
count inventory separately to be close substitutes: dealers may not have an incentive to hold
out for a higher price even if a particular car is in low inventory if consumers are willing to
25purchase similar cars for which there is more inventory.
We analyze whether our granular inventory deﬁnition aﬀects our results in two ways. First,
we see whether the estimated price-inventory relationship changes when we control for the
inventory of car variations that are potential substitutes for the car under consideration. The
inventory measure we use throughout the paper is at the level of the interaction of make, model,
model year, body type, transmission, doors, and trim level. We now deﬁne SubstituteInventory
as the inventory of all cars that share the make, model, model year, body type, and doors
of the transacted cars. In other words, this variable capture how many cars the dealer has
in inventory that are of the same model, year, and body type (sedan, coupe, convertible,
etc.) but diﬀer in transmission and trim level. We now estimate our basic speciﬁcation with
the addition of controlling for SubstituteInventory. The results in column 4 of Table 3 show
that the estimated price-inventory relationship is essentially unchanged if we hold constant the
number of “substitute” cars that are in the dealer’s inventory. We ﬁnd that the inventory of
these substitute cars is negatively related to the transaction price of the car, however, the eﬀect
is very small. For each additional substitute car in inventory, the transaction price of the car
under consideration decreases by 0.0055%.
Our second approach to analyzing whether our granular inventory deﬁnition aﬀects our
results is to change the level at which we deﬁne inventory. Instead of deﬁning SubstituteIn-
ventory, we directly redeﬁne our inventory measures at the level of the interaction of make,
model, model year, body type, and doors. The results in column 5 of Table 3 show that the
estimated price-inventory relationship is slightly smaller under the redeﬁned inventory measure.
One additional car in inventory at below median inventory levels decreases price by 0.07% in
contrast to 0.09% with the more granular inventory deﬁnition. Similarly, one additional car in
inventory at above median inventory levels decreases price by 0.0083% in contrast to 0.016%
with the more granular inventory deﬁnition.
In summary, our basic results seem to be robust to a change in the level at which we measure
inventory and to whether we control for the number of “substitute” cars that are in the dealer’s
inventory.
7 Extensions
We have predicted in section 2.2 that the inventory-price relationship will be stronger in some
cases than in others. In this section we present a series of speciﬁcations to test these ideas.
267.1 Does inventory matter diﬀerently for cars with strong demand?
One could argue that our stylized model best describes cars that are in strong demand relative
to supply. For these car models it is close to impossible for dealers to make use of dealer trades
to obtain additional cars on short notice if their demand realization is higher than expected.
Thus, we expect to observe that inventory eﬀects are larger for these cars than for others where
dealer trades may be costly but possible and for which dealers know that a situation of low
inventory will very likely be short-lived.
Consequently, we examine whether the inventory eﬀect is diﬀerent for cars which face robust
demand relative to supply. We expect to observe that inventory eﬀects are larger for these cars
than for others. We deﬁne such “hot” cars using the average time such cars stay on a dealer’s
lot across all dealerships in our sample. We average this time interval, known as “days to turn,”
across the whole sample for a car in a calendar year. If DaysToTurn of a car in a calendar
year is in the lowest quartile, we deﬁne the car as “hot.” Notice that this deﬁnition of “hot”
encompasses a full quarter of all the cars in our sample. These are cars that are generally “in
demand,” not necessarily cars that garner media attention for having long waiting lists. This
latter group is a much smaller fraction of new cars sold.
We replicate our basic speciﬁcation (column 2 in Table 3) using interactions of our inventory
variables and DaysToResupply with the “hot” indicator. The results in column 1 of Table 5 are
partially consistent with our hypothesis. While one additional car in inventory at above median
inventory levels has a much larger eﬀect on price when a car is in overall short supply than
when it is not (-0.06 vs. -0.014), there is no diﬀerence for below median levels of inventory. This
speciﬁcation also illuminates our previous ﬁnding that days to resupply only aﬀected prices for
low levels of inventory. We had hypothesized that this is the case because a dealer with low
inventory is more likely to run out of cars to sell when that dealer has to wait longer for new
supply. This suggests that the price for “hot” cars, i.e. cars that are in overall short supply and
for which dealers are less likely to have high inventory levels would also be sensitive to when
the next shipment arrives. Consistent with this, the interaction between DaysToResupply and
the “hot” indicator is positive and (marginally) signiﬁcant.
7.2 Does inventory matter diﬀerently towards the end of the calendar month?
Next we examine whether the price-inventory relationship diﬀers at the end of the month. As
one can see across all speciﬁcations in the paper, cars that are sold at the end of the month sell
for between 0.22% and 0.32% less than those sold at other times. This is because manufacturers
and dealers impose non-linear sales targets on sales personnel which increases their incentive
to sell additional cars at the end of the month. Due to these incentives we expect to observe
27that at the end of the month dealers are less likely to hold out for a high price when inventory
levels are low than they would at other times.
To test whether this is the case we replicate our basic speciﬁcation using interactions of
our inventory variables and days to resupply variables with the EndOfMonth indicator. The
results in column 3 of Table 5 are not consistent with this hypothesis: while the EndOfMonth
indicator continues to show that prices are lower at the end of the month, the price-inventory
relationship seems not to be any diﬀerent during that time.
7.3 Does inventory matter diﬀerently when a dealer’s lot is full?
Finally, we expect to ﬁnd a stronger price eﬀect of inventory when a dealer lot is close to
maximum capacity. This is because the inventory cost associated with the last few cars which
the dealer can store on his lot may be particularly high. For example, the dealer might have
to use customer parking, thereby decreasing revenue, or reduce spacing between parked cars,
increasing the danger of damaging cars on the lot. Hence, we expect that inventory that is close
to lot capacity will decrease the dealer’s opportunity cost of selling a car and thus decrease
transaction prices.
To test this hypothesis we add to the speciﬁcation the indicator LotFull that is one when
the total inventory held by the dealer across all cars is 95% or more of his maximum inventory
over the sample period. We ﬁnd no support for the hypothesis: the estimated coeﬃcient on
LotFull is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see column 2 of Table 5). One possible explanation
for this ﬁnding is that dealers are not normally size constrained. Therefore, reaching 95% of
their maximum inventory over the sample period may not a good indicator of sharply increased
inventory cost.
8 Inventory vs. price discrimination eﬀects
We would like to get some sense of how much of the variation in car prices can be explained
with price discrimination through bargaining and how much can be explained with inventory
ﬂuctuations. This is important because negotiated prices in car retailing are usually attributed
to the fact that dealers try to price discriminate among consumers. Since we measure only a
subset of what dealers observe when price discriminating among consumers, we cannot estimate
precisely what fraction of the price variation can be attributed to these two factors. We can,
however, determine how this fraction changes as a function of the type of dealership.
We measure and compare the average eﬀect on price due to demographics and inventory
using two indices. One is an index of the component of predicted price attributable to demo-
28graphic factors,19 the other the component of predicted price attributable to inventory factors.
We calculate these two indices as follows: We estimate a full speciﬁcation (Table 5, column 1
with the addition of LocalInventory, SubstituteInventory, and LotFull) on a sample excluding
no-haggle dealerships (see below). From the vector of estimated coeﬃcients, ˆ β, we extract two
subvectors, ˆ βD and ˆ βI, which are the vectors of coeﬃcients for the demographic covariates and
inventory covariates, respectively. The two indices are the products of these two coeﬃcient
subvectors and their corresponding data submatrices. Using the notation of equation (6), the
demographic index is D ˆ βD where D includes income, race, home ownership, and all other con-
sumer demographics. The inventory, or supply-side index is I ˆ βI, where I includes the inventory
and days to resupply measures, whether the car was a dealer trade, and LocalInventory, Sub-
stituteInventory, and LotFull. Note that neither index includes the portion of the predicted
price attributable to car and transaction characteristics (car ﬁxed eﬀects, vehicle cost, model
recency, competition, weekend, region, and month). We measure the contribution of the two
sets of factors to the overall variation in negotiated prices by comparing the relative magni-
tudes of the two indices. For each observation in the dataset, we divide the absolute value of
the inventory index by the sum of the absolute values of both indices. Intuitively, this ratio
measures the movement in price due to inventory versus that due to demographics for each
observation when also controlling for other covariates. Averaging this ratio across observations,
we ﬁnd that for “haggle” dealerships the inventory measures explain, on average, 49.1% of the
combined inventory and demographic components of the predicted price.
We can now test our empirical prediction about the relative magnitude of the inventory and
price discrimination eﬀects as a function of the type of dealership. Since many consumers have
a high disutility of bargaining, some dealerships promise consumers a “no-haggle” price. “No
haggle” does not mean ﬁxed prices. These dealerships continue to set car prices daily based
on their inventory and demand conditions; the no-haggle policy means that salespeople are
discouraged from varying price across buyers who arrive on a particular day. Consequently, we
expect that inventory ﬂuctuations explain a larger percentage of price variation at “no-haggle”
dealerships. We test this prediction for AutoNation, the largest chain of car dealerships in the
US. AutoNation owns close to 300 dealerships nationwide (representing many diﬀerent makes)
and in 1996 adopted a policy of not negotiating with consumers. Our ﬁnal data contains
45,280 transactions at AutoNation dealerships (out of a total 351,916 transactions). We expect
inventory ﬂuctuations in these dealerships to play a bigger relative role than in traditional
19We know from prior work that prices vary substantially with demographics, even after controlling for dealer
ﬁxed eﬀects (Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2003). This indicates that our demographics can serve
as (imperfect) measures of the price discrimination.
29dealerships.20
We run separate regressions for transactions at AutoNation dealerships. We again calculate
the indices described above. We ﬁnd that the proportion of the inventory and demographic
related price variation explained by inventory measures is 73.9% in AutoNation dealerships
compared to 49.1% in the haggle dealerships.
These calculations conﬁrm that inventory plays a larger role relative to demographics in
no-haggle dealerships. On the face of it, these ﬁndings seem to indicate that salespeople at Au-
toNation dealerships still condition prices on consumer demographics. However, recall that the
empirical correlation between transaction prices and consumer demographics could be driven
by diﬀering search methods or by outside opportunities that vary systematically by demo-
graphic characteristics, rather than price discrimination. While we are unable to distinguish
between these two reasons for demographics and price to be correlated, we are able to show
that inventory plays a larger role relative to demographics in the no-haggle setting.
9 Conclusion
We conclude from the evidence presented in the paper that local dealer inventory has a statis-
tically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the prices at which new cars are sold in the United
States. A dealership moving from a situation of shortage to an average inventory level lowers
transaction prices by about 1% ceteris paribus, corresponding to 15% of average dealer mar-
gins or $250 on the average car. Additionally, shorter resupply times also decrease transaction
prices for cars in high demand. We present some extensions of our results showing that local
inventory also aﬀects transaction prices and also that the eﬀect of inventory is stronger for car
models in high demand.
These results suggest that there is a valid economic, non-price-discriminatory reason for
auto dealers to avoid posting prices for their cars. Since demand and supply conditions change
constantly, the opportunity cost of using ﬁxed, posted prices is substantial. Of course, setting
price by negotiation opens the door to price discrimination. Interestingly, the dealerships that
are trying to appeal to consumers who don’t like price discrimination choose no-haggle pricing,
not posted prices, as a method of sale.21 These dealerships, like traditional dealerships, appear
to ﬁnd the menu costs of maintaining posted prices that accurately reﬂect vehicle scarcity, or the
opportunity costs of using posted prices that do not, too high to justify such a policy. We ﬁnd
20Saturn dealerships also have a policy of not haggling with customers. However, we have such few Saturn
observations in our dataset that we cannot estimates all inventory and demographic eﬀects on a Saturn-only
sample.
21carsdirect.com is the only retailer we know of to set posted prices for cars. Note that its large scale reduces
the “per sale” menu costs.
30that price variation at no-haggle dealerships is less well predicted by consumer demographics,
while inventory considerations remain important. The share of the predicted price attributable
to either inventory or demographics that is due to inventory is 49% in traditional dealerships.
For so-called “no-haggle” dealerships, inventory explains 74% of the combined inventory and
demographic components of the predicted price. This is consistent with salespeople at no-haggle
dealerships engaging in less price discrimination.
We conclude that price diﬀerences in car retailing are in part the result of scarcity rents,
and function partially to eﬃciently allocate particular cars that are in restricted supply to those
customers who value them most highly.
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32Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Price 25,757.24 10,361.88 5213 126,490 351,916
Inventory 15.47 14.87 1 80 351,916
DaysToResupply 8.44 12.22 1 147 351,916
#Cars arriving in week+1 3 4.23 0 71 351,916
#Cars arriving in week+2 2.92 4.17 0 88 351,916
#Cars arriving in week+3 2.84 4.16 0 76 351,916
#Cars arriving in week+4 2.75 4.12 0 79 351,916
TradedCar 0.07 0.26 0 1 351,916
# Competing Dealers 4.31 3.15 0 23 351903
%Black 4.2 9.67 0 100 351,916
%Hispanic 15.16 11.69 0 55.33 351,916
HispanicName 0.15 0.35 0 1 351,916
%Asian 10.95 12.14 0 100 351,916
Asian 0.07 0.26 0 1 351,916
Female 0.29 0.45 0 1 351,916
Income 61,383.28 26,187.54 11,318 150,000 351,916
Income2 4.45E+09 3.95E+09 1.28E+08 2.25E+10 351,916
%CollegeGrad 32.8 17.4 0 100 351,916
%LessHighSchool 12.36 11.98 0 100 351,916
%HouseOwnership 66.69 24.79 0.14 100 351,916
%Professional 16.95 8.71 0 100 351,916
%Executives 18.17 8.22 0 100 351,916
%BlueCollar 25.27 15.33 0 100 351,916
%Technicians 3.07 2.09 0 100 351,916
MedianHouseValue 240,999.25 113,620.25 7500 500,000 351,916
CustomerAge 42.36 13.05 16 102 351,916
Age> 64 0.06 0.24 0 1 351,916
VehicleCost 0 0.05 -0.64 0.88 351,916
Model Age 5-13 Months 0.68 0.47 0 1 351,916
Model Age > 14 Months 0.05 0.23 0 1 351,916
Weekend 0.37 0.48 0 1 351,916
EndOfMonth 0.22 0.41 0 1 351,916
EndOfYear 0.02 0.16 0 1 351,916
33Table 2: Price eﬀects of inventory†
Fixed Eﬀects
Dep. Var. Car, Dealer, Car*Dealer, Car*Dealer,
ln(price) Month Month Month*Segment*DMA
Inventory (1-10) -.085** -.092** -.064**
(.0044) (.005) (.0051)
Inventory (11+) -.018** -.016** -.013**
(.0013) (.0018) (.0019)
DaysToResupply (1-4) -.015 -.0052 -.0035
(.0095) (.0095) (.0095)
DaysToResupply (4+) .0005 .0013 .0011
(.001) (.0011) (.0011)
TradedCar -.0075 -.0072 -.0028
(.035) (.035) (.035)
EndOfYear .017 -.0033 -.09
(.077) (.076) (.076)
EndOfMonth -.31** -.28** -.38**
(.025) (.025) (.025)
Weekend .07** .066** .067**
(.022) (.022) (.022)
VehicleCost 98** 99** 99**
(.22) (.23) (.23)
Model Age 5-13 Months -.98** -.94** .048
(.033) (.034) (.043)
Model Age > 14 Months -1.9** .54** .38**
(.076) (.076) (.096)
Income -.00001** -8.7e-06** -8.5e-06**
(2.3e-06) (2.3e-06) (2.3e-06)
Income
2 7.3e-11** 6.2e-11** 6.1e-11**
(1.2e-11) (1.2e-11) (1.2e-11)
%CollegeGrad -.0018 -.0013 -.0016
(.0015) (.0015) (.0015)
%LessHighSchool .0099** .0095** .0096**
(.002) (.002) (.002)
%HouseOwnership -.00027 -.00039 -.00045
(.00068) (.00068) (.00067)
MedianHouseValue -3.8e-07* -3.9e-07* -4.1e-07*
(1.8e-07) (1.7e-07) (1.7e-07)
%Professional -.0029 -.0033 -.0033
(.0022) (.0022) (.0022)
%Executives .0018 .00085 .0012
(.0023) (.0022) (.0022)
%BlueCollar -.0012 -.0012 -.00096
(.0018) (.0017) (.0017)
%Technicians -.011* -.013* -.013**
(.0051) (.005) (.005)
CustomerAge .014** .014** .014**
(.00096) (.00095) (.00095)
Age> 64 .0056 -.0099 .0018
(.051) (.051) (.051)
Female .14** .14** .14**
(.022) (.022) (.022)
%Asian -.0024* -.002* -.002*
(.00097) (.00096) (.00095)
%Black .012** .011** .011**
(.0012) (.0012) (.0012)
%Hispanic .0056** .0051** .0049**
(.0017) (.0017) (.0017)
Constant 1008** 1008** 1009**
(.49) (.16) (.28)
Observations 351916 351916 351916
Adj. R-squared 0.974 0.975 0.976
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; [*] signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car, dealer, and monthly ﬁxed eﬀect (column 1); car*dealer and monthly ﬁxed eﬀect
(column 2); car*dealer and month*segment*DMA ﬁxed eﬀect (column 3).
All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100. 34Table 3: Robustness checks†
Dep. Var. ln(price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DTR with # DTR at low Local Substitute Coarser
of arrivals inventory Inventory Cars Inven. Def.
Inventory (1-10) -.092** -.088** -.08** -.085**
(.005) (.0053) (.0054) (.0056)
Inventory (11+) -.016** -.016** -.01** -.015**
(.0019) (.0018) (.0019) (.0019)
DaysToResupply .001 .00046 .00049 .00061
(.00099) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
DTR* .0035+ .0036+ .0045*





















TradedCar -.0073 -.0074 -.0073 -.0045 .004
(.035) (.035) (.035) (.037) (.036)
EndOfYear -.0043 -.0036 -.004 -.027 -.025
(.077) (.076) (.076) (.08) (.08)
EndOfMonth -.28** -.28** -.28** -.28** -.28**
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.026)
Weekend .063** .063** .066** .058** .059**
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.022) (.022)
VehicleCost 99** 99** 99** 99** 99**
(.23) (.23) (.23) (.24) (.24)
Model Age -.94** -.94** -.88** -.95** -.93**
5-13 Months (.034) (.034) (.034) (.035) (.035)
Model Age -1.8** -1.8** -1.7** -1.8** -1.7**
> 14 Months (.076) (.076) (.077) (.078) (.078)
Constant 1008** 1008** 1008** 1008** 1009**
(.16) (.16) (.16) (.17) (.17)
Observations 351916 351916 351916 332020 332020
Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.976
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; [*] signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
† Unreported are car*dealer, monthly ﬁxed eﬀect, and the demographic variables reported in
Table 2.
All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
35Table 4: Instrumental variables†
Dep. Var. ln(price) (1) (2)
OLS IV
Inventory (1-10) -.11** -.17**
(.014) (.063)
















Model Age 5-13 Months -1.2** -1.1**
(.088) (.1)






+ signiﬁcant at 10%; [*] signiﬁcant at 5%; **
signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
† Unreported are car*dealer, monthly ﬁxed ef-
fect, and the demographic variables reported
in Table 2.
All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
36Table 5: Additional speciﬁcations†
Dep. Var. ln(price) (1) (2) (3)
Hot Cars End of Month Lot Full
























TradedCar -.0066 -.0072 -.0074
(.035) (.035) (.035)
EndOfYear -.0048 -.0028 -.0036
(.076) (.076) (.076)
EndOfMonth -.28** -.22** -.28**
(.025) (.068) (.025)
Weekend .064** .063** .063**
(.021) (.021) (.021)
VehicleCost 99** 99** 99**
(.23) (.23) (.23)
Model Age 5-13 Months -.94** -.94** -.94**
(.034) (.034) (.034)
Model Age > 14 Months -1.8** -1.8** -1.8**
(.076) (.076) (.076)
Constant 1008** 1008** 1008**
(.16) (.16) (.16)
Observations 351916 351916 351916
Adj. R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.975
+ signiﬁcant at 10%; [*] signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car*dealer, monthly ﬁxed eﬀect, and the demographic
variables reported in Table 2.
All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.







         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         









         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         










         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
    
                          
                                              
                    






         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         







         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         









         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
    
                          
                                           
                          








         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         









         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         











         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
    
                          
                                              
                        

















             
         

















             
         
                                                


















                
                























                
                
                                                
 
42Figure 6: Distribution of the number of vehicles (at the inventory“car” level) arriving on a day

















         
                                               















         
                                               
                                                
 
43Figure 7: Comparison of the price-inventory relationship across car-dealer sales volume quartiles
with the full sample results

















































Size Quartile 1 Size Quartile 2 Size Quartile 3
Size Quartile 4 Spline for all sizes
44Figure 8: Comparison of the full sample estimates with the estimates and associated conﬁdence
intervals for each car-dealer sales volume quartile

















































Size Quartile 1 CI (lower bound)
CI (upper bound) Spline for all sizes

















































Size Quartile 3 CI (lower bound)
CI (upper bound) Spline for all sizes

















































Size Quartile 2 CI (lower bound)
CI (upper bound) Spline for all sizes

















































Size Quartile 4 CI (lower bound)
CI (upper bound) Spline for all sizes
Figure 9: Number of observations by size quartile and inventory dummy for the estimations in
Figures 7 and 8.†
Inventory Mean Size Quartile
Decile Inventory 1 2 3 4 Total
1 1.6 7,814 9,679 8,747 6,931 33,171
2 3.0 4,305 5,720 5,838 5,381 21,244
3 4.5 7,390 10,771 11,659 12,158 41,978
4 6.5 5,654 8,550 10,293 12,471 36,968
5 8.5 3,815 6,376 8,910 11,907 31,008
6 11.4 4,237 8,523 12,758 21,524 47,042
7 15.4 1,958 4,152 8,355 18,818 33,283
8 20.3 1,144 2,639 6,599 23,699 34,081
9 28.8 346 1,285 4,741 30,453 36,825
10 50.6 37 164 1,436 34,679 36,316
Total 36,700 57,859 79,336 178,021 351,916
45